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Abstract
To express attitudes and act according to their self-interest, citizens need relevant, 
up-to-date information about current affairs. But has the increased commercialization 
in the media market increased or decreased the flow of political information? Hallin 
and Mancini stress that the existing empirical evidence is fragmented and that this 
question therefore has been difficult to answer. In this article the authors present new 
data that allow them to systematically examine how the flow of political information 
on TV occurs across six Western countries during a thirty-year period. The authors 
find that the flow of political information through TV varies according to the degree 
of commercialization. The flow of news and current affairs is lowest in the most 
commercially oriented television system and among the commercial TV channels. 
There is however important cross-national variation even within similar media 
systems. The authors’ data do not suggest a convergence toward the liberal system 
when it comes to the political information environment on TV. Rather, what strikes 
them is how strongly resistant some European countries have been to subordinating 
the needs of democracy to profit making.
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One of the most important and dominant questions in the study of political communi-
cation is how the media aid citizens to become informed voters (Holbert 2005: 511). 
The media are expected to provide sufficient and relevant political information so that 
citizens can hold their representatives to account and make informed choices (Carpini 
and Keeter 1996). Yet there is considerable uncertainty about whether recent changes 
in the media environment are supporting or impeding increased public affairs knowl-
edge. This uncertainty is reflected in Hallin and Mancini’s (2004: 279) landmark 
survey of western media systems. “One of the most difficult questions to sort out,” 
they maintain, “is whether commercialization has increased or decreased the flow of 
political information and discussion.” “The existing empirical evidence,” they con-
tinue, “is fragmentary and not entirely consistent” and is complicated by the play of 
other influences. But if the consequences of commercialization are uncertain, at least 
one trend is, in their view, beyond doubt. Commercialization “has encouraged the 
development of a globalised media culture that substantially diminishes national dif-
ferences” (Hallin and Mancini 2004: 282).1
Hallin and Mancini’s baffled response to contradictory and insufficient evidence, 
in this area, is something with which we empathize. That said, we endeavor to reach 
a more finite conclusion on the basis of new data, gathered for the period 1987 to 2007, 
in relation to the United States, the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, and Norway. These are six countries that Hallin and Mancini portray as, 
respectively, examples of liberal (United States, United Kingdom) and democratic 
corporatist models. The focus is on television as the principal supplier of political 
information to a broader public. By offering a systematic examination of the supply 
and demand of news and current affairs broadcast by the four principal television 
channels in these countries, we reveal whether the flow of political information varies 
according to media systems. We also investigate whether there is evidence of a con-
vergence in the political information environment, as more media systems become 
increasingly commercialized.
These research questions are elaborated in more detail later. First, let us take a closer 
look at why the political information environment is important and how these environ-
ments may vary according to different media systems.
Democracy, Media Systems, and the Informed Citizen
Democracy functions best when its citizens are politically informed. As Carpini and 
Keeter (1996) demonstrated, informed citizens are better citizens judged by the stan-
dards of democratic theory. They are more likely to participate in politics, more likely 
to have meaningful, stable attitudes on issues, better able to link their interest with 
their attitudes, and more likely to choose political representatives who are consistent 
with their own attitudes. Thus, for normative as well as empirically supported reasons, 
it is desirable that the media adequately inform the electorate about public affairs.2 
News and commentary enable citizens to make informed and effective choices about 
the exercise of state power.
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In many respects, politically relevant information is more widely available now 
than at any time in history. There has been an increase in the number of TV channels, 
and the rise of Internet during the late 1990s and 2000s should be viewed as being as 
significant as the rise of television during the 1950s. This does not mean, however, 
that the flow of political information is better than ever before. Although online news-
papers are growing and their print versions are declining, the Internet is predominantly 
used for entertainment purposes and not for seeking news and current affairs informa-
tion. When people surf the Web, they are more likely to seek information about their 
special interests rather than visit mass media sites (Hilt and Lipschultz 2004). There is 
not much evidence suggesting that the Internet has been established as a primary 
source of news, either in Europe or in the United States, save for a minority (Castells 
2009: 231).3
Indeed, Prior (2007) argues that the greater choice introduced by Internet and cable 
TV actually encourages more people to diminish their exposure to political informa-
tion. In essence, changes in the US media environment have made it easier both to find 
and also to avoid news and current affairs. “Political information in the current media 
environment,” Prior (2007: 26) writes, “comes mostly to those who want it.” Thus, 
two changes are taking place, which are linked but not identical. Both the multiplica-
tion of channels and increasing commercialization have the potential to influence the 
flow of political information and distribution of public affairs knowledge.
If this is judged to matter or not depends on both the normative standard one requires 
of a good citizen as well as the empirical evidence. Patterson (2000) and Bennet (2003) 
are among those who take a pessimistic view and claim that the evidence suggests that 
fragmented news weakens the foundation of democracy by diminishing the public’s 
information about public affairs. Zaller (2003) is more optimistic when he argues, in 
line with Schudson (1998), that normative democratic theory places unnecessary and 
unrealistically heavy demands on “the good citizen” and that the ideal rather should be 
that of the “monitorial citizen.” Zaller argues that, because of heuristics and cognitive 
shortcuts, citizens can get the information they need by “scanning the environment for 
events that require response.” In what he calls the “burglar alarm standard,” he suggests 
that intense, dramatic, and entertaining coverage will lead more citizens to get more 
information because it is more tailored to the needs of the low-information citizens. 
Therefore, they argue that it is entirely appropriate that some media should provide 
only a basic news service that the “monitorial citizen” will scan, while other media 
offer fuller news coverage and commentary to satisfy the demands of the news junkie 
(Zaller 2003).
Zaller’s argument is that even a thin diet of news consumed by the majority is suf-
ficient to sustain a healthy democracy. We believe that there is reason to question this 
assumption, as a heavy diet of entertainment and a low level of public engagement 
left large numbers of Americans woefully ignorant about the cause of the second Iraq 
War (2003) fought in their name. In the aftermath of the invasion, one-quarter of the 
American public continued to believe that the United States had found weapons of 
mass destruction and that Saddam Hussein was implicated in the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
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(Kull et al. 2004). In the ensuing period, 2004–6, these proportions actually increased 
despite the way in which information that clearly demonstrated the falsity of these 
perceptions became publicly available (Castells 2009).
Some studies have already suggested that the American media system gives rela-
tively little attention to public and foreign affairs. For instance “soft news” has grown 
at the expense of “hard news” on American network television during the past two 
decades (Hamilton 2004: 184). According to one estimate, the time devoted to enter-
tainment, disasters, and accidents more than doubled in network television newscasts 
between 1990 and 1998 at the expense of public affairs coverage (Bennet 2003, 14). 
U.S. media coverage of foreign affairs was also significantly reduced during the post–
cold war period of 1988–96 (Schudson and Tifft 2005: 35), as was U.S. investment in 
foreign news gathering (Shanor 2003). Previous analysis has also suggested that com-
mercial news tends to be broadcasted at an early fringe time, whereas public broad-
casting systems have traditionally broadcast the news in the heart of prime time 
(Semetko 2000; Hallin and Mancini 2004: 280).
From this it can be inferred that different media systems create a structural bias in 
favor of different political information environments. This can produce, in turn, sig-
nificant cross-national differences in the levels of political knowledge and mispercep-
tions. Some studies already suggest such a pattern. Dimock and Popkin (1997: 223) 
showed that Europeans were very much better informed about world events than were 
Americans and suggested that this was because of “substantial differences between 
countries in the communication of knowledge by TV.” Iyengar et al. (2009) and Cur-
ran et al. (2009, 2010) also argue that the liberal media models have a soft news focus, 
which makes U.S. and British citizens less informed about politics and current affairs 
than citizens in countries with strong public service broadcasting regimes.
Although some scholars have pointed to the growing Americanization of European 
media systems, “information programs” still account for a substantial proportion of 
both total and prime-time output in much of Western European television (Curran 
2002: 192). However, within the European context there are significant differences 
among the traditional public service channels, the “hybrid” commercial public service 
channels, and relatively unregulated commercial satellite or cable channels. Syvertsen 
(2002: 42) and Carlson and Harrie (2001: 121-25) demonstrate how news and infor-
mation constitute a larger share of the programs in the traditional public service chan-
nels compared to the commercial public service channels where the focus is more 
oriented toward drama, entertainment, and sports. Therefore, one central hypothesis of 
this study is that commercial media have a structural bias in disfavoring news and cur-
rent affairs. We anticipate that media systems dominated by commercial television, 
low levels of media regulation, and a strong consumer orientation will tend not to sup-
ply significant quantities of news and current affairs in prime time when most people 
actually watch television. By contrast, countries with more public television, higher 
levels of media regulation, and a stronger orientation toward serving democracy are 
expected to offer a substantial share of news and current affairs in prime time.
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Moreover, if it is true that we are experiencing a homogenization of media systems, 
where the liberal commercialized media model is expanding at the expense of other 
models, we would expect to see a convergence of political information environments. 
If this is the case, we will find that prime-time news and current affairs are declining 
and that the democratic corporatist television systems that dominate most of north-
western Europe are becoming more like their liberal commercial counterparts in the 
United States.
Data
This study is based on data from six countries. They are Belgium,4 the Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In all countries we have 
included information about news and current affairs programs broadcasted by four 
major broadcasters in 1987, 1997, and 2007. Data on news and current affairs pro-
grams have been collected from the TV guides of the two main PBS and two main 
commercial TV stations where applicable.5 In the four “democratic corporatist” coun-
tries (Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden), commercial stations had not 
yet been established in 1987, but by 1997 all four had up to one or two commercial 
channels that competed with the public service channels. In the liberal countries (the 
United States and the United Kingdom), commercial channels were well established 
by 1987. For an overview of individual channels included in this study, see Table A1 
in the appendix.
The TV guides for these channels were coded the second week in every month 
for all three years.6 Coders were asked to include the following two categories in 
the data set:
1. News: This includes all news reports that are broadcast, save for sport and 
weather forecasts. Coders were asked to deduct approximately 20 percent if 
the latter was included in the newscast. Both national and local news was 
coded and is included in this study, as is news directed toward children, the 
deaf, and various linguistic minority groups. Specialized news programs on 
business, culture, or entertainment were not included.
2. Current affairs: This includes all programs that give more background infor-
mation concerning recent social or political events. It also includes political 
talk shows, political debates, and documentaries that focus on recent political 
events. More popular talk shows that occasionally invite a politician are not 
included. Popular factual entertainment programs that have a main focus on 
human interest or crime are not included. In the case of “breakfast television” 
shows, it was estimated that approximately 10 percent of its content was 
allocated to news and 10 percent to current affairs.
The unit of analysis is the individual program, which was measured in minutes. The 
programs were also identified by date, time, TV channel, type of program, and whether 
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or not this was a rerun. For commercial channels 10 percent of the time was deducted 
to exclude time spent on advertisements. Advertising time is generally higher in the 
United States and has increased over the years. Hence, in the U.S. case we deducted 
20 percent of program time in 1997 and 30 percent in 2007. These and other decisions 
on the actual program time are obviously rough estimations but were taken after care-
ful consideration and discussion with country experts.
The flow of political information is not only a question of supply. Equally impor-
tant is demand, registered in the share of people who spend time consuming the news 
and current affairs programs offered to them. In 1987 a single accepted method of 
measuring audience size was not yet established in five out of the six countries 
included in this study. Therefore, we have only included audience figures from 1997 
to 2007. In the four democratic corporatist countries, the various broadcasters have 
provided us with their average audience ratings and market share for their main news 
program.7 For the United Kingdom and the United States audience ratings were col-
lected from publicly available resources (United Kingdom: Barb data; United States: 
Nielsen ratings provided by Project for Excellence in Journalism). The audience fig-
ures should be interpreted with caution as measurement procedures tend to vary both 
across countries and also across time.
The Flow of Political Information
In all countries, except the United States, there has been a substantial growth in the 
total volume of news and current affairs programs on leading television channels 
during the period 1987–97 (see Figure 1). This growth was partly a consequence of 
the expansion of daytime provision of news and current affairs content, but it also 
arose from the ending of television monopolies and the rise of new general chan-
nels, offering news and current affairs programs that built large audiences.8 In 
addition to this growth of journalism provision in the core TV sector, the total 
number of television channels also proliferated, including twenty-four-hour news 
channels such as Sky News (1989) and BBC 24 (1997) in the United Kingdom and 
TV2 Nyhetskanalen (2007) and SVT24 (1999) in the Scandinavian case.9 In four of 
our six countries, this increase was slightly reversed between 1997 and 2007. This 
drop was most pronounced in the United Kingdom, where the British audience on 
average was offered approximately one and a half hours more news and current 
affairs in 1997 than in 2007.
Only Norway and Belgium experienced a growth of leading channel news and cur-
rent affairs in this last decade. In Norway this was caused by the public broadcaster 
NRK changing its profile for its number 2 channel. Until then NRK2 had mainly 
focused on cultural and special interest programs, but when NRK launched its third 
channel (NRK3) in September 2007, the public broadcaster decided to refocus the 
NRK2 programming on news and documentaries. In Belgium, the total growth of 
news and current affairs is mainly caused by a further increase in length of the main 
news broadcast on both the commercial and public broadcaster channel.
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The evolution of the news flow of the United States has been quite different from 
those of the other countries, with the total volume of its news decreasing over time. 
Still this total amount of news remains higher compared to that in the European coun-
tries. It is important to keep in mind that much of this news is local news and that this 
share has increased significantly over the years. In 1987 about one-third of its news 
consisted of local news, compared with over half in 2007, which differs strongly from 
the European sample.10 Although local news includes politically relevant information, 
it tends to include more information about crime, accidents, and sport. We return to 
this issue in the conclusion.
Nevertheless, the ending of television monopolies and the rise of new general chan-
nels have obviously given the audience a larger supply of news and current affairs. In 
short, citizens in these six countries had ready access to an enormous increase in the 
volume of news and current affairs commentary. Never before in the history of democ-
racy have electorates been supplied with so much information about public affairs on 
TV as they are today. However, the vast majority of this increase took place outside 
prime time. The fact that the volume of public affairs information increased between 
1987 and 2007 does not demonstrate therefore that more attention was paid to it. We 
now have a situation in which a larger volume of news and current affairs is offered to 
the public at times when few people traditionally watch television. Since daytime TV 
does not attract significant audiences, the growth in total volume is not proof of 
increased consumption.
Figure 1. Supply of news and current affairs according to time of broadcast, 1987–2007: 
Average minutes per day
Note: News and current affairs programs broadcast between 12 A.M. (midnight) and 6 A.M. are not 
included.
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Let us therefore turn to the time of day when audience ratings are highest. The 
black lines in Figure 1 give us the average number of minutes of news and current 
affairs during peak hours (7 P.M. to 10 P.M.). Here, the dominant pattern is one of stabil-
ity. In four of our six countries the change from 1987 to 2007 must be considered small 
and insignificant. Again only Norway and Belgium have experienced a significant 
increase in peak-time news and current affairs between 1987 and 1997 that was not 
been reversed later. In other words, despite a higher number of TV channels offering 
news and current affairs in 2007 compared to 1987, the amount of news and current 
affairs offered at peak times to the public remains remarkably stable. We also see that 
the lowest share of prime-time news and current affairs, hardly twenty minutes a day, 
is provided by the four U.S. channels. It is also worth mentioning that the broadcasters 
in the United Kingdom, also categorized by Hallin and Mancini (2004) as a liberal 
media system, provide a very similar amount of prime-time news as the four demo-
cratic corporatist countries. We believe this is caused by the relative importance of 
public service television as a central player in the United Kingdom compared to the 
commercially driven media landscape of the United States.11
Indeed a central assumption in this study is that commercial media organizations 
will be less focused on news and current affairs and that this will be especially appar-
ent in prime time. Figure 2 confirms that this is clearly the case: in all six countries com-
mercial channels devoted on average significantly less time to news and current affairs 
during peak hours compared to public channels. Although a clear pattern over time in 
the different countries is absent, there is little indication that PBS and commercial 
Figure 2. Supply of news and current affairs during peak hours among Public Service TV and 
Commercial TV, 1987–2007: Average minutes per day
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television have grown toward each other. In the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, 
Norway, and the United States, the difference has even increased.
What can explain the rather large country differences, particularly between the 
United States on one side and the European countries on the other? There are at least 
two obvious explanations, both relating to the way TV is organized. In the United 
States public television is weak and underresourced, whereas in Northern Europe pub-
lic television is relatively well financed and still important. No less important, com-
mercial television in the United States is subject to minimal regulation. In Northern 
Europe, however, commercial television is incorporated into the regime of public ser-
vice (with the partial exception of Britain). This gives rise to a different division of 
labor. In the United States, its very weak public TV shoulders nearly all the burden of 
informing the public in prime time. By contrast, the leading commercial TV channels 
in Europe still offer substantial peak-time news and current affairs. In the European 
context even a commercial channel that aims at a broad audience seems to need a 
prominent news service for its overall credibility.12
Underlying these differences is a divergence of institutional goals. American televi-
sion is directed toward maximizing revenue and is oriented toward serving the Ameri-
can consumer. By contrast, European television gives greater relative priority to serving 
the needs of democracy. This gives rise to one very concrete and important difference. 
The principal American television channels transmit news and current affairs programs 
at the fringe of popular viewing times. By contrast, the principal channels in our sample 
of European countries (with the partial exception of Britain) transmit news and current 
affairs during peak times. In the United States the three largest channels (all commer-
cial) provide their main evening news shows at 6:30 P.M.13 The largest TV channels in 
the democratic corporatist countries, however, provide their main evening news show 
at the heart of prime time. This holds even for most commercial channels included in 
our sample. Thus, while the American television system makes it difficult for viewers 
to encounter news and comment about public affairs by scheduling these outside peak 
viewing times, the European system makes access to news and current affairs easier by 
doing the opposite. Table 1 provides an overview of the scheduling of the two main 
evening news programs in the six countries.
The time when news programs are broadcast influences the size of their audiences 
and the number of citizens who follow the news.14 Table 2 presents the number of view-
ers of the two main channels evening news show as a percentage of the country’s popu-
lation. Generally, the news broadcast provided by the public service channel attracts 
more viewers than the commercial news shows across all the European countries, 
though with two exceptions in 1997. In Belgium the commercial news program Het 
Nieuws was watched by more people then the public competitor called Het Journaal. 
This can be seen as a reflection of the instant success of the introduction of commercial 
television in 1989, which shrunk the market share of the PBS channel, then viewed as 
bureaucratic and politicized. After a cumulative process of modernization and “depo-
larization,” Het Journaal regained its position as the leading news program and was in 
2007 watched by approximately 12 percent of the population in Belgium (Flanders). 
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We also see that ITV’s news at 10 in the United Kingdom attracted somewhat more 
viewers than BBC in 1997. ITV, the leading commercial channel, had broadcast its 
main evening news show at 10 P.M. since 1967. In 1999 however, it was moved to 11 P.M. 
to create an uninterrupted space for high-ratings entertainment. The BBC, exposed to 
increased competitive pressure, shifted its main news program from 9 to 10 P.M. in 
2000. It was only when public pressure increased that ITV returned its news program 
to its original slot at 10 P.M., for four nights in 2008 and five nights in 2009. But by then 
ITV news had lost a significant part of its audience that it never regained.
Viewing statistics demonstrate that there also are significant differences in TV 
news consumption among the various countries. Generally, audience figures are 
higher in the democratic corporatist countries compared to the liberal countries, but 
with the United Kingdom being much closer to the other European countries than to 
the United States. Dagsrevyen, the most popular evening news show in Norway, was 
watched by approximately 15 percent of the Norwegian population on average in 
2007. By comparison, the most popular news program in the United States, NBC 
Nightly News, was watched by less than 3 percent of the American population. Trans-
lated into market shares, this means that 66 percent of Norwegians watching television 
at that time of day were tuned into the public service news. In the United States, how-
ever, only 12 percent of those who watched television at that time were tuned into 
NBC’s evening newscast. This dramatic difference in people watching the news can 
be seen as a consequence of differences in political culture, geography, and the way in 
which television is organized.
There has been a general decline in TV news consumption, mostly both for 
public as well as for commercial TV stations. This is the case in the United States, 
Table 1. Overview of the Two Biggest TV Channels’ Main Evening News Programs in 2007
by Country, Type of Channel, and Transmission Time
Belgium Netherlands Norway Sweden
United 
Kingdom
United 
Statesa
Biggest, 
channel
VRT (PBS), 
Het 
Journaal, 
start at 
7 P.M.
Ned1 (PBS), 
NOS 8 uur 
journaal, 
start at 
8 P.M.
NRK1 (PBS), 
Dagsrevyen, 
start at 
7 P.M.
SVT1 (PBS), 
Rapport, 
start at 
7:30 P.M.
BBC1 
(PBS), 
BBC 
News, 
start at 
10 P.M.
NBC 
(Com), 
Nightly 
News, 
start at 
6:30 P.M.
Second 
biggest 
channel
VTM 
(Com), 
Het 
Nieuws, 
start at 
7 P.M.
RTL4 (Com), 
RTL4 
Journaal, 
start at 
7:30 P.M.
TV2 (Com), 
Nyhetene, 
start at 
9 P.M.
TV4 (Com), 
Nyheterna, 
start at 
7 P.M.
ITV 
(Com), 
News 
at Ten, 
start at 
10 P.M.
ABC 
(Com), 
World 
News, 
start at 
6:30 P.M.
a. Network evening news in the United States may be broadcasted at different times in different local 
markets. The transmission time may therefore start at 6 P.M. or even 5:30 P.M.
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United Kingdom, Sweden, and Norway. In Belgium and the Netherlands the number 
of viewers and also market shares remained remarkably stable. However, this different 
evolution has not increased the variation within the four democratic corporatist coun-
tries but rather has made them more similar in terms of their TV news viewing.
Conclusion
In our study of the political information environment, we used two central arguments 
of Hallin and Mancini (2004) on media systems as a starting point. The first is that 
different systems of organizing political power are associated with different ways of 
Table 2. Evening News Viewership: Percentage of Viewers Relative to Country’s
Population Size
 1997 2007
Belgium
 Main public service evening news 8.6 12.0
 Main commercial evening news 13.6 10.0
Netherlands  
 Main public service evening news 9.4a 9.8
 Main commercial evening news 5.8a 6.1
Norway  
 Main public service evening news 20.4 15.4
 Main commercial evening news 12.7 10.7
Sweden  
 Main public service evening news 16.8 11.2
 Main commercial evening news 5.2 5.4
United Kingdom  
 Main public service evening news 8.9 7.9
 Main commercial evening news 9.9 6.1
United States  
 Main NBC evening news 3.9 2.7
 Main ABC evening news 3.7 2.7
Note: Entries are based on average viewing statistics provided by broadcasters. These figures are cal-
culated and presented in the table as percentages of the total population. For simplicity, the population 
figures are kept constant across the ten-year period. Population figures are Norway 4.6 million, Belgium 
(Flanders) 6.3 million, Sweden 9.1 million, the Netherlands 16.6 million, the United Kingdom 61.1 million, 
and the United States 307.2 million. The following programs are included in our measurement. Norway: 
Dagsrevyen 1900, Nyhetene 2100; Sweden: Rapport 1930, Nyheterna 1830/1900; Belgium (Flanders): Het 
Nieuws 1900, Het Journaal 1900; Netherlands, Het Nieuws 1930, Het Journaal 2000; United Kingdom: BBC1 
Ten O’Clock News (Nine O’Clock News until October 2000), ITV News at Ten/ITV Evening News (yearly 
averages are derived from Barb data at the British Film Institute); United States: NBC and ABC news 
broadcast at 6:30 P.M. For the United States, average viewership is for November based on Nielsen Media 
Research figures (reported by Project for Excellence in Journalism in 2007 and 2008 annual reports 
on the State of the News Media (http://www.stateofthenewsmedia.org/2009/previous.php). Norwegian 
measurement procedures were significantly changed in 2000. Swedish figures are based on average ratings 
for the first and third quarters of the year.
a. Figures from Netherlands are from 2001.
266  International Journal of Press/Politics 15(3)
organizing the media and of doing journalism, leading to their tripartite zoning of 
media systems. Their second central argument is that these differences are diminish-
ing, mainly as a consequence of the growing influence of the market. We argue, based 
on the empirical evidence presented here, that both arguments are problematic, or at 
least need more nuance. We discuss the “commercialization” argument first and exam-
ine country differences second.
Hallin and Mancini (2004: 279) declared that it is very difficult to sort out whether 
commercialization has increased or decreased the flow of political information. Study-
ing the information provided by the four biggest terrestrial TV channels (still the dom-
inant news media) in six Western countries, we find that peak-time supply of political 
information varies according to media system, or rather the degree of commercializa-
tion. It is lowest in the most commercialized of these countries, the United States. The 
time the three largest TV channels, NBC, ABC, and CBS, allocate to news and current 
affairs in prime time is in a comparative perspective exceptionally low. Partly as a 
consequence, their main newscasts also attract a relatively small share of viewers. In 
countries where public television has a stronger standing, the public are offered more 
prime-time news and current affairs, not only by PBS channels but also by commercial 
ones. Viewer statistics also demonstrate that a larger share of the population in these 
countries actually does consume the television news offered to them. The public ver-
sus commercial logic is also evident if we compare broadcasters within countries. 
Commercial TV channels offer less prime-time news compared to the national PBS 
channels, and their newscasts generally attract fewer viewers.
However, the term commercialization implies not only differences between public 
and commercial organizations but also a shift over time. Do we see evidence of con-
vergence in the political information environment as a consequence of increasing mar-
ket influence on television? There are traces of convergence, most notably because the 
number of terrestrial channels increased as television monopolies ended in the demo-
cratic corporatist countries. This caused a growth particularly in daytime provision of 
news and current affairs programs, which prior to 1997 were extensive only in the 
liberal systems. Thus, by 2007 all six countries included in this study had substantial 
daytime TV news. Within the democratic corporatist countries we found some evi-
dence of convergence between public and commercial TV channels in terms of when 
they broadcast news and current affairs.
Political information convergence in the TV sector has, however, not occurred if we 
focus on prime-time programming or the number of citizens following the main eve-
ning news, which after all are the two most important factors when considering the flow 
of information. Our data do not suggest that the supply of prime-time news and current 
affairs has become more similar across the different media systems during the twenty-
year period included in this study. If anything, differences between the democratic cor-
poratist countries and the United States have increased in this respect. Similarly, even 
if several countries have experienced a decrease in news audiences, this has not funda-
mentally changed the major differences that persist between the United States and the 
Northern European countries in terms of TV news consumption. Our conclusion there-
fore is that when it comes to the political information environment provided by the 
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major TV channels, general trends of commercialization and a more globalized media 
culture have not diminished important national differences. If what impresses Hallin 
and Mancini (2004) is a worldwide convergence toward a commercial market model, 
what strikes us is how strongly resistant some countries have been to subordinating the 
needs of democracy to profit making.
Both British and American media are bracketed together by Hallin and Mancini as 
part of the “liberal” camp and the media of the remaining countries in our sample as 
belonging to the democratic corporatist bloc. However, our analysis based on the pro-
vision, scheduling, and consumption of news places U.S. television out on a limb and 
British television as having greater affinities with the television systems of other 
European countries. Thus, the peak-time and evening news provision of news and cur-
rent affairs on leading channels is 6 times higher in the United Kingdom than in the 
United States. Overall, the news provision of British television is comparable to that 
in the four other European countries. Viewing of the news in the United Kingdom is 
also much higher than in the United States.
Thus, it would seem that British TV has more in common with its European neigh-
bors than with its liberal “partner” country, the United States. Within the democratic 
corporatist bloc, there is some degree of internal differentiation for which multiple 
country-specific reasons can be identified. In particular, the divergent strategies of 
public broadcasters in the different countries seem to be crucial. For Norwegian PBS, 
an important goal is to be the “biggest broadcaster in the country.” By contrast, the 
primary aim of Swedish PBS is to be among the “best PBS organizations in the world” 
(Larsen 2008: 333).
This indicates that perhaps the content and the quality of the news might vary sub-
stantially even between different European PBS channels. Previous findings do suggest 
that a considerable share of news programs, even in democratic corporatist systems, is 
devoted to soft news (Curran et al. 2009, 2010). The daily news show of the private 
Dutch broadcaster SBS6 called “The Heart of the Netherlands” was even excluded 
from this analysis because it never focused on political affairs. The growth of soft news 
is probably a response to increased competition and the fragmenting, and sometimes 
eroding, TV audience for news and current affairs. Because soft news is perceived to be 
more entertaining, it is included as a bait to attract a larger audience. Thus, the chal-
lenge facing TV news providers in most countries is how to reach a lot of people but at 
the same time provide quality news on public affairs. Perhaps commercialization has its 
strongest impact not on the amount of news and current affairs knowledge but on its 
character, reflected in a shift toward soft news and away from public affairs.
Zaller (2003) argues that it is entirely appropriate that some media should provide 
only a basic news service that the “monitorial citizen” can merely scan and that a 
modicum of news consumed by the majority is sufficient to sustain a healthy democ-
racy. We believe, however, that a fuller diet of news and current affairs is to be pre-
ferred over a sparse one, if democracy is not to become anorexic. The major problem 
with a thin diet (or an average of six minutes of prime-time news offered by the three 
biggest channels as in the U.S. case) is that citizens have to make an active effort to 
seek out substantive news programs. When more time is devoted to news and current 
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affairs in prime time, as in the European case, more people inadvertently watch the 
news because these are broadcast on the biggest TV channels at a time when most 
people actually watch television. Differences in quantity and quality as well as in 
when news is offered contribute to the higher level of public affairs knowledge among 
European citizens compared to their American counterparts documented in previous 
research (Dimock and Popkin 1997; Curran et al. 2009, 2010; Iyengar et al. 2009). 
Public service scheduling of news at peak times designed to foster inadvertent view-
ing, especially among those not particularly interested in politics, also helps to reduce 
gaps in current affairs knowledge between the advantaged and disadvantaged (Curran 
et al. 2009) and thus create better democracies. The fact that there is a continuing 
divergence between television systems matters.
Appendix
Table A1. Overview of Channels Included in the Study
 1987 1997 2007
Belgium   
PBS 1 BRT1 TV1 Eén
PBS 2 BRT2 TV2/Canvas Canvas
Private 1  VTM VTM
Private 2   
Netherlands   
PBS 1 Ned1 Ned1 Ned1
PBS 2 Ned2 Ned2 Ned2
Private 1  RTL4 RTL4
Private 2  SBS6 SBS6
Norway   
PBS 1 NRK NRK1 NRK1
PBS 2  NRK2 NRK2
Private 1  TV2 TV2
Private 2  TVNorge TVNorge
Sweden   
PBS 1 SVT1 SVT1 SVT1
PBS 2 SVT2 SVT2 SVT2
Private 1  TV4 TV4
Private 2 —a TV3 —a
United Kingdom   
PBS 1 BBC1 BBC1 BBC1
PBS 2 Channel 4 Channel 4 Channel 4
Private 1 ITV ITV ITV
Private 2  Channel 5 Channel 5
United States   
PBS 1 PBS PBS PBS
Private 1 NBC NBC NBC
Private 2 ABC ABC ABC
Private 3 CBS CBS CBS
a. TV3 was launched on December 31, 1987, but did not broadcast any news in 2007.
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Notes
 1. Hallin (2009) has, in a brief recent article, rowed back a little from the media convergence 
thesis.
 2. While this remains the standard position, it is contested by “elite democracy” theorists and 
advocates of low information rationality who argue that it is unrealistic to expect most citi-
zens to be highly informed about public affairs and that democracy functions just as well or 
even better when citizens are apathetic (see Clawson and Oxley 2008: 183).
 3. A recent study based on European Social Survey (ESS) data from thirty European countries 
also indicates that people use the Internet as a supplement rather than an alternative to tra-
ditional news media use (Blekesaune et al. 2009).
 4. When we talk about Belgium in this study we actually mean Flanders, the Dutch-speaking 
north of Belgium, containing about 60 percent of the Belgian population.
 5. Data from the United States include three commercial and only one PBS station. In Belgium 
we included only one commercial channel as there is only one commercial channel that 
offers news and current affairs. In Sweden, there was only one commercial channel that 
offered news in 2007, and there was only one main commercial channel that provided news 
in the United Kingdom in 1987.
 6. Weeks when national election campaigns took place are not included in this study. Hence, 
we only include eleven weeks for Belgium in 1987 and ten weeks in 2007. In Norway only 
eleven weeks are included in 1997.
 7. Iacob Christian Prebensen at NRK, Birgit Eie at TV2, and Bengt Nordström at SVT helped 
us with the Norwegian and Swedish audience ratings. Dutch data were supplied by Sticht-
ing Kijkersonderzoek (SKO) Netherlands, and Belgian data were supplied by VRT (public 
broadcaster for Flanders; data source is CIM/GfK-Audimetrie).
 8. This is reflected in an increase in the number of channels in our sample. This grew from 
fourteen channels in 1987 to twenty-three in 1997, the same number as in 2007.
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 9. These twenty-four-hour news channels are not included in our sample.
10. In 2007, the share of local news was 15 percent in Norway and 9 percent in the United 
Kingdom.
11. Hallin and Mancini (2004) also cite the strength of public service broadcasting as the main 
feature the United Kingdom shares with the democratic corporatist system.
12. This may well change. Commercial channels that are not forced by regulation to maintain 
a news service may consider it unnecessary to compete with PBS channels on news and 
current affairs. In Norway, the commercial channel TVNorge closed down its entire news 
department in October 2009. They declared that they would rather spend their resources on 
entertainment and concentrate on a young audience that would yield greater advertising. 
By contrast, the largest Norwegian PBS channel expanded its main evening news program 
from thirty to forty-five minutes in January 2010.
13. Note however that there may be variations between the different local media markets in the 
United States in terms of when network evening news is broadcasted. Sometimes it is also 
broadcast at 6:00 P.M. or even 5:30 P.M.
14. The number of competing channels offering news is of course another important factor 
influencing audience ratings.
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